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Introduction 
 
What is autonomy and what is its potential in relation to the city? Cities are increasingly being 
positioned as essential to tackling some of the world’s major challenges, from global environmental 
issues to economic development and political security. Yet the extent to which cities have the 
capacity to respond is contested. The capacities of such cities to foster wellbeing, sustainability and 
justice are intimately related to ways of understanding and practising autonomy. Cities today are 
variously understood as having either too little autonomy, in their capacities to advance their own 
development models, address urban inequalities or develop low carbon and sustainable modes of 
living, or too much—via, for example, financial sectors in London and New York acting beyond 
regulation. If the level of autonomy that a city has from the national state is often a highly complex 
and politicised question, the question of how to understand contemporary city autonomy is all the 
more vexing. Is it a form of autonomy from political regulation by the national state? From the 
constricted options available in powerfully competitive global capitalist economies? Or from the 
environmental and other regulations imposed by transnational agreements? As urbanism goes global, 
at a time when the very idea of the city is being called into question (e.g. Amin, 2013; Brenner and 
Schmid, 2015; Jacobs, 2012), it may seem odd—outdated, even—to talk of ‘urban autonomy’. Yet, 
cities remain epistemologically specific places, with specific histories and livelihoods closely linked 
to the performance and governance of a particular territory, even as that territory is relationally 
produced (McCann and Ward, 2011). Rather than a redundant category, cities are shaped by—and 
are central forces reshaping—both global economy and society in ways that complicate autonomy.  
In this article we seek to advance our understanding of the role of cities in responding to 
contemporary challenges by examining the concept of urban autonomy. Initially conceived as part of 
the Friends of the Earth Big Ideas Change the World projecti, we undertook to probe the question of 
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how and why urban autonomy can be developed in order to provide the basis for cities to take a role 
in achieving transformational change for sustainable development. Too often cities are regarded as 
either subsumed by the powers of national government or as having the free reign to ‘act local’ while 
thinking global. Neither position has stood the test of time. We argue in favour of a form of 
‘enhanced autonomy’ as the basis for improving the social and environmental potential of cities. 
Following the broad approach of the Big Ideas Change the World project, our collaboration with 
Friends of the Earth involved drawing on our own fieldwork as well as secondary literature and 
seeking to learn from a diverse and comparative range of examples of urban autonomy taking place 
in different contexts and scales, and in relation to a wide array of social, economic and 
environmental concerns (see Bulkeley et al. 2013). In this article, we further develop these cases and 
the ideas presented in this policy arena. We develop and extend a set of conceptual arguments 
concerning the nature and potential of urban autonomy and relate these debates to those concerning 
the contemporary nature of urban politics. Through this work, our intention is to contribute to the 
academic debate concerning the nature of contemporary urbanism. Particularly in a context where 
there is growing momentum to the argument that we are witnessing a new era of planetary urbanism, 
understanding the political particularities of the urban seems all the more pressing. 
We do this by considering four different contexts where debates over urban autonomy have taken 
place in recent history (Brazil, UK, India and South Africa). Through the use of a historical 
perspective, we identify key elements and enablers in the making of urban autonomy: a characteristic 
that exists in a variety of guises and forms and creates a contested patchwork landscape of 
differentially powerful fragments. Given our focus on promoting social well-being and 
environmental improvement in the city, our focus is on autonomy in relation to the state. We are 
concerned with how powerful actors of different sorts operate together in the arrangement of power, 
often in conflictual ways, to address challenges at the city level. There is, of course, another tradition 
of thinking and practising urban autonomy as a political project away from the state (e.g. traditions 
of autonomy linked to autonomist Marxist movements that take us away from urban democracies as 
they are currently constructed, as well as forms of contemporary struggle against neoliberalism suvh 
as the Occupy movement; see Katsiaficas, 2006; Merrfield, 2013; Vasudevan, 2014; Pickerill and 
Chatterton, 2006). While we touch on this disparate tradition at different points in the discussion—in 
relation to urban social movements—it is not our focus here.  
A brief word on the comparative approach we take in the paper. Our discussion examines a number 
of cities across the global North-South divide and at different points in time, including Delhi, 
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Mumbai, Durban, Porto Alegre, and various contexts in the UK. Our purpose in doing so is to 
consider how autonomy operates across distinct political, economic, cultural and historic contexts, 
with often-different challenges, and to locate general principles that work across urban space 
globally. The comparative discussion reveals how autonomy is not just a multifaceted process, but 
how it is differently enabled or inhibited by issues of territory, institutional capacity, and political 
context. Using comparison as a learning strategy (Robinson, 2015; McFarlane, 2011), we show that 
seeking to enhance autonomy through one dimension or element at a time—be that financial, 
political or administrative—is unlikely to be successful and may have other unintended 
consequences.  
We also identify four specific forms of autonomy through our comparison: distributed autonomy, 
where autonomy is purposefully designed as a form of political power sharing; networked autonomy, 
which is based on the functioning of autonomous units within the city, such as social movements, 
working in tandem and linking ideas together; fragmented autonomy, based on the presence of 
autonomous units and processes, but operating in chaotic and fragmented ways, and where objectives 
and processes are not joined up; and coerced or ‘enclave’ autonomy, a top-down governmental 
autonomy with strong elements of hierarchical management. The comparison allows us to show that 
these four forms are not necessarily specific to particular cities, but that cities experience elements of 
each of them. The comparison also allows us to examine the challenges and opportunities for 
enhancing meaningful and effective autonomy in the city and to consider what autonomy has been 
able to achieve.  
 
Framing urban autonomy 
Autonomy is a complex idea, encompassing notions of independence and separation, self-sufficiency 
and self-control, and stretching to regard and respect. Whilst often seen as an interstice between 
control and regulation (Dahl, 1982), politically it is perhaps the idea of self-determination  which has 
most caught the imagination (Habermas, 1994). In this conceptualisation, autonomy has positive 
connotations: of a society or community pursuing a common goal with some level of self-
determination. But autonomy has also come to be associated with absolute forms of independent rule 
and strict containment; of boundaries, strong levels of control, and social conservatism (Paddison, 
1983). Such a ‘closed’ form of autonomy sits uncomfortably with our idea of a globalizing world. 
Yet, understood as a moral state of independence in which respect for others’ independence is 
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integral, autonomy is naturally bounded or constrained in the interests of the social good—without 
such constraints, requiring an exercise of hierarchical power. It therefore holds a promise of 
alternative forms of social organisation and of a politics that could enable radical transformations.  
Cities lie at the heart of contemporary questions of autonomy. They are themselves celebrated spaces 
of cultural, political, and economic autonomy, and yet simultaneously cast as increasingly limited in 
their (autonomous) powers as they become centrally implicated into the flows of global politics, 
trade, and resources. Critically, cities are not to be seen as “self-enclosed political [territories] within 
a nested hierarchy of geographical arenas contained within each other like so many Russian dolls” 
(Brenner et al., 2003: 1). In such guise, the question of autonomy would appear straightforward: how 
much of what kind of autonomy should be allocated to the city, by whom and under what conditions, 
in order to achieve certain social goals? Here, authority and autonomy are distributed in a ‘zero sum’ 
fashion, so that as one political territory (the city) gains autonomy a loss of control or determination 
occurs at another level of political authority.  
Yet within the social sciences, there is a growing recognition that to regard political organisation as a 
‘nested system’ is to miss the critical ways in which political order and authority have been 
reconfigured across and within scales, and through new forms of political networks (MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999; Bulkeley, 2005). Others go so far as to interpret political spaces to be a series of 
rhizomatic, interrelated and interwoven relational becomings or as a pluralist assemblage of human 
and non-human forces (cf. McFarlane, 2011; Amin and Thrift, 2013). Cities here are symbiotic 
politically—and economically and culturally—with other spaces at other scales (Massey, 2007). 
They are not homogenous, but fractured socially, economically, and politically, for instance in 
overlapping forms of power and shifting configurations of urban governance. So we should not 
(necessarily) expect to find autonomy readily circumscribed within particular boundaries or 
organised in hierarchical terms. If, from this perspective, ‘the city’ cannot be understood as a 
homogenous or contiguous political territory, neither can autonomy be seen as a fully formed 
political condition that can be simply adjusted through the machinations of urban governance.  
Autonomy in the city exists in a multiplicity of forms and through various manifestations, creating a 
patchwork landscape of differentially powerful fragments of autonomy. By viewing urban autonomy 
from this starting point, we can avoid any assumption that urban autonomy necessarily means ceding 
power from the (central) state or that it would automatically entail empowering local communities, 
however defined. Such assumptions have already been challenged by urban scholars who have 
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identified how a collapse in notions of local democracy and local autonomy leads to a false belief 
that increases in one inevitably lead to increases in the other (Pratchett, 2004), problematizing 
simplistic understandings of the local as an ideal scale configuring a more democratic city that better 
serves the needs of citizens (Purcell, 2006). Conditional forms of local autonomy (referred to within 
the UK as ‘earned’ autonomy) create the illusion of greater local influence and power despite an 
increase in central control (Coaffee and Headlam, 2008; Wilson, 2003). Taking these viewpoints 
further, but emphasizing the dispersed, fragmented and situated nature of local autonomy, we can 
examine how and why autonomy matters in debates about urban futures, and explore the ways in 
which autonomy is being realised or could be enhanced within the contemporary urban condition. 
We argue that the route forward is not to provide blanket calls for greater local autonomy, but in 
identifying and enabling a portfolio of forms of autonomy—and associated responsibility—that 
better serve social and environmental agendas.  
This does not exclude possibilities for devolution of political power to localities. Indeed in many 
countries greater fiscal, administrative and political autonomy at the functional city scale may form a 
desirable or even necessary part of the transformation of fragmented autonomy into some degree of 
meaningful and effective autonomy from the vicissitudes of global economic competition and 
financial markets (Janssen-Jansen and Hutton, 2011; Lefèvre, 2010). But it does suggest—as we 
shall see in the cases outlined later—that in some important ways meaningful autonomy can neither 
be granted to nor foisted upon cities or their components. Instead, autonomy is relational, “always 
fractured, partial and ongoing”; “a temporary and situated social construct” (Coppola and Vanolo, 
2014: 1 and 4). Practically, it implies that for city leaders, frustrated about constraints on their 
freedom to implement their visions for change, enhanced autonomy may be found as much through 
collaboration with communities or businesses within the city, or through networking with other 
cities, as it is to be found in renegotiated relationships with national authorities.  
Critically, autonomy is neither a one-dimensional property of the organisation of the state (in 
political, administrative or financial terms) nor an attribute that can be readily conferred on a 
particular territory or form of society; rather, autonomy is a multi-faceted political project, achieved 
relationally and as such subject to political change. But what of the state, long an object of analysis 
vis-à-vis its own ‘relative autonomy’ from the spectre of economic determination (Jessop, 1990) and 
increasingly acknowledged to be “an important component in the urban development landscape” 
(Parnell and Robinson, 2012: 593)? Far from acting as some all-powerful monolith or Leviathan, in 
substantive terms the state is an institutional ensemble; any power attributed to or distributed through 
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the state only constitutes the power of particular agents and forces which are assembled into its 
purview (a representational regime), and thereby enabled to act within and through the very 
institutional ensemble that is the state (Jessop, 2016). It is within such a context that we can envisage 
how, rather than being devoid of autonomy, cities contain multiple possibilities for autonomy. The 
particular form and institutional and social base of any urban state can enable a range of forms of 
autonomy: we have characterised four that appear to be prevalent within contemporary urban 
conditions—fragmented, coerced (or enclave), distributed and networked. While cities may 
experience one or more of these forms of autonomy at any one time, they are very different in the 
extent to which they support the social and environmental outcomes sought from enhanced, effective 
and meaningful autonomy. Access to the representational regime can enable critical interventions 
from those with the vision to perhaps transform fragmented and coerced autonomy into distributed 
and networked forms in order to deliver enhanced social and environmental capacity on the ground.  
 
Urban autonomy in historical perspective: identifying elements and enablers  
 
The idea of autonomy is central to the historical development of the city. Autonomy is not only a 
political idea or set of properties to be implemented, but a practice that emerges from and comes to 
form part of particular societies. In this section, we consider two different historic contexts—South 
Africa and Brazil—to illustrate how autonomy is multifaceted and enabled or inhibited by issues of 
territory, institutional capacity, and political context. This suggests that seeking to enhance autonomy 
through one dimension or element at a time—be that financial, political or administrative—is 
unlikely to be successful and may have other unintended consequences.  
 
South Africa: opportunities and challenges for Local Agenda 21 in Durban 
 
1994 marked the beginning of a post-apartheid era for South Africa. Faced with the need to rapidly 
democratise society and reinvent government, South Africa embraced pre-existing international 
frameworks as potential guidelines for future action (Sowman, 2002). Local Agenda 21 (LA21), 
initiated in Durban in 1994, became more than a tool for the promotion of local autonomy towards 
environmental action: it was seen as a possibility to incorporate greater local participation towards 
the identification of priorities for developing strategies and projects (Rossouw and Wiseman, 2004). 
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In the context of the significant transformations of the post-apartheid years, LA21 provided a 
window of opportunity for the adoption of new local management concepts and practices, including 
novel forms of understanding urban autonomy. Its success was largely due to the promotion of social 
and political agendas above and beyond environmental agendas, where community empowerment, 
health and environmental quality were key drivers in response to jobs and service provision concerns 
(O’Riordan, 1998).  
However, rolling out LA21 in Durban was a learning process marked by challenges (Roberts and 
Diederichs, 2002), from limited political will and support and limited resources and capacity 
mismatch to shortcomings on financial autonomy. LA21 was largely seen as a ‘green’ and foreign 
agenda concerned primarily with environmental issues. In South Africa, given a history of 
environmental concerns marked by exclusionary strategies for ecosystem conservation, 
environmental policy issues were often seen “as tools for racially based oppression” (Rossouw and 
Wiseman, 2004: 131). Resource limitations were both human and financial, impacting the ability of 
the program to build its required broad consensus. Capacity building took the shape of environmental 
education initiatives at different levels, which helped deliver public engagement and support while 
also broadening the range of political agendas included. Dependency on external donor funding 
limited the capacity of the municipality to direct investments towards local priorities over those of 
funders. Finally, there were changes in the city’s territorial configuration created by shifts in 
administrative boundaries resulting from the transition to democracy. Durban went from 300 square 
kilometres before 1996 to 2,297 post-2000, requiring the LA21 process to adjust its operations and 
expectations to a more functional understanding of the urban area. The challenges experienced 
highlight the tensions resulting from the deployment of local autonomy initiatives under limited 
conditions for their realization. These were characterized by overlapping competences and 
fragmented environmental functions within and across different scales of government (Sowman and 
Brown, 2006; Rossouw and Wiseman, 2004). South Africa embraced the principles of LA21 via 
local environmental programs, but with a marked absence of “mechanisms for translating these 
policies into practice” (Sowman, 2002: 185). Despite efforts to the contrary, local environmental 
issues were incorporated within local and national hierarchical structures primarily in ways that give 
strategic concerns precedence over local issues (Sowman, 2002).  
A broader critical analysis of the LA21 process points to the risks and limitations associated with the 
institutionalization of the local as “the key scale for environmental action” (Lawhon and Patel, 2013: 
1). This implies questioning the now common LA21 principle of ‘thinking globally, acting locally’. 
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It demands that we ask what and whose concerns are highlighted and obscured as ‘the local’ 
becomes the primary space for developing solutions of global reach, and how such emphasis 
responds to pressing questions on international responsibility and ethics (Lawhon and Patel, 2013). 
Viewing the local as the privileged site for environmental solutions often overlooks conflicting 
interests operating at regional, national and international levels. It also fails to account for the wider 
organizational and political contexts within which such local agendas are necessarily adopted and 
developed (Marvin and Guy, 1997). Sustainability is somehow to be achieved in tandem with the 
development of market economies and global competitiveness, despite unanswered questions 
regarding the compatibility of these two aims (Krueger and Gibbs, 2007). In reality, local 
environmental initiatives constantly find themselves at odds with the mandates of trade agreements 
and policy mechanisms operating at national and global levels (Gibbs, 1999). This exemplifies the 
extent to which the development of urban autonomy via tools such as LA21 needs to “make the 
necessary connections to regulatory processes operating at a variety of spatial scales” (Gibbs and 
Jonas, 2000: 2999). Their limited results are as related to the type of challenges and limitations 
experienced by Durban as much as to the unchallenged “acceptance of the merits of the local framing 
[and] the evasion of questions that this framing silences, particularly questions of responsibility and 
justice at various scales” (Lawhon and Patel, 2013: 1).  
However, this analysis does not so much dismiss arguments in favour of a local dimension to 
sustainable development, as highlight a major obstacle to its likely effectiveness. Such experiences 
suggest that LA21 initiatives establish neither local freedom, nor responsibility and power. The 
potential benefits of local environmental and social initiatives for experimentation, innovation and 
public involvement remain unrealised. The implications are twofold. First, interventions to establish 
autonomy in single dimensions (such as environmental practice) are doomed to fail—cities need 
autonomy to negotiate new, less uniform and less constrained relationships with the global economy, 
rather than greater autonomy to try to be competitive within it as it is currently constituted. Second, 
‘local autonomy’ itself emerges as a misleading term, and instead we need to connect power and 
accountability in multiple dimensions such that the city—constituted by its unique place in these 
relationships—can become a focal point for the development of livelihoods and lifestyles that deliver 
and promote wellbeing for all. 
 
Brazil: the political framing of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre 
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Some of the most promising experiments with urban autonomy have taken place in Brazil. With the 
collapse of the military dictatorship and the growth and eventual success of the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT, the Workers Party) in national elections came decentralisation of power to local 
levels. A key urban success area for the PT has been in participatory budgeting, with the most 
notable example being Porto Alegre, where there has been mass participation, elements of 
redistribution and a balanced budget. Citizens decide and deliberate upon a variety of municipal 
policies, the cornerstone of which is the much-publicized Orçamento Participativo (Participatory 
Budget), a neighbourhood-based set of deliberative forums on the city’s budget priorities.  
Scholars have outlined various characteristics supporting the success of this initiative (Baiocchi, 
2001; Sintomer et al., 2008): clear procedures for organisation, representation and participation; 
engagement of both individual and collective actors, such that participation is two-tiered involving 
both individuals and community organisations; provision of spaces for debate, information 
distribution and activism (with participatory forums functioning as spaces for airing local demands 
and problems and for sharing information about government functioning); and the provision of 
opportunities for people to learn about content-related issues (e.g. budgets) as well as the technical 
criteria involved in budgeting and its ramifications for planning urban operations. Once people 
become involved in participatory budgeting, they are more likely to take part in participatory forums 
in other sectors, including education, health, infrastructure services and sports facilities, amongst 
others (Baiocchi, 2001; Abers, 2000). Success was aided by a combination of different modes of 
democracy: participatory (e.g. regular regional debates and learning initiatives) and representative 
(e.g. through the Municipal Council of the Budget).  
The process resulted in “a reversal of priorities: primary health care was set up in the living areas of 
the poor, the number of schools and nursery schools was extended, and in the meantime the streets 
were asphalted and most of the households have access to water supply and waste water systems” 
(Sintomer et al., 2008: 166-167). However, none of this means, of course, that the views of the poor 
and the better-off register in equal measure, and there is no reason to believe that participatory 
forums somehow undo existing inequalities: indeed unequal access to service provision was a high-
level stake in protests across many Brazilian cities before the 2014 World Cup. And the success of 
urban participatory forums in Porto Alegre is, to be sure, partly a function of the city’s relative 
wealth compared to other cities in Brazil. Yet the experience of Porto Alegre suggests that successful 
autonomy in urban governance requires political will, social demand, an innovative idea, and a sense 
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of genuine meaningful group participation, and emerges from a process of negotiation between the 
state and society. It is, moreover, not a question of more or less state involvement.  
The South African and Brazilian examples contain key lessons for thinking about urban autonomy, 
such as the need to attend to the realistic potential of formal devolution of powers when set against 
economic constraints and imperatives. Cities need autonomy that extends beyond just one sphere 
(environmental, political or economic) if autonomy as a principle is to succeed; otherwise, they will 
be unable to assert their own issues and will be corralled by the structures of competition within the 
global economy. Successful autonomy requires political will, but also more than this: social demand, 
innovative ideas that energise people, and a sense of genuine rather than tokenistic participation 
(combining, for example, forms of representative and participatory democracy). ‘Local autonomy’ 
itself is therefore a misleading term; the challenge is more accurately to link power and 
accountability in multiple dimensions and geographies that allow the city to exert as much capacity 
as it can to promote the wellbeing of its inhabitants. 
 
Realising autonomy: learning from urban realities  
 
The history of urban politics has been shaped by the need to determine its autonomy in relation to 
other levels of the state (Cox, 1993). But rather than being entirely subsumed by other levels of the 
state, or the global economy, the city is rich with possibilities for greater autonomy. At any given 
moment, it contains a multiplicity of sites where different forms of autonomy can be realised. 
Everyday life is made, in large part, through activities that are locally or self-organised. 
Communities and municipalities work to develop and deploy different forms of autonomy and self-
determination, from the organisation of social services to efforts to address environmental 
challenges. The extent and limitations of urban autonomy are subject to continual renegotiation 
between urban authorities, nation-states, international agencies and economically powerful actors, 
creating new possibilities for greater autonomy. Yet not all forms of autonomy are the same. Some 
are fleeting, others embedded, some disempowering and others a force for change.  
Building on the analysis developed in the previous section, here we argue for the need to recognise 
four alternative forms of urban autonomy—fragmented, coerced (or enclave), distributed and 
networked—that could help provide the architecture for building alternative social and 
environmental futures. Cities normally experience elements of each of these four forms of autonomy. 
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By focusing on four different urban contexts (London, Mumbai, Delhi and the contemporary 
localism initiatives promoted by UK governments), this section explores how these different 
understandings of autonomy are currently being played out. From this starting point, we examine the 
challenges and opportunities for enhancing meaningful and effective autonomy in the contemporary 
city, what autonomy has been able to achieve, and how issues of responsibilities have been addressed 
in such attempts to fashion autonomy.  
 
London: creating distributed autonomy towards urban sustainability from a space of partial 
autonomy? 
 
London, like many metropolitan areas, has a complex governance structure. As part of the Thatcher 
Government’s culling of local socialism, the Greater London Council was abolished in 1986, and in 
2000 a Greater London Authority (GLA) was reinstated alongside 33 borough councils responsible 
for particular districts in the city. The GLA combines elements of administrative autonomy in 
relation to planning, political autonomy in the form of a Mayor and an elected body with decision-
making powers, and a small degree of financial autonomy achieved through an additional ‘council 
tax’ payment by London residents. This combination of partial administrative, political and financial 
autonomy has been critical in the development of an urban sustainability agenda, particularly in 
terms of transport, energy and climate change. Examples of this are the introduction of the 
‘congestion charge’ (2003), investment in alternative modes of transportation, the development of 
one of the first urban climate adaptation plans, a long term commitment to reducing GHG emissions 
by 2050 and a policy goal of 25% of energy needs to be met by decentralised generation (Bulkeley 
and Schroeder, 2008; 2012). The actions of the Mayor and the GLA take inspiration and learning 
from the pioneering work of several London borough councils, and rely on the alignment of this 
agenda with private sector and non-profit interests. In addition, the engagement of communities and 
local organisations has been critical both to the development of London’s environmental 
programmes and their achievements.  
There are several examples of how the GLA has taken advantage of forms of distributed autonomy to 
advance an environmental agenda. For example, many of the GLA’s sustainable energy initiatives 
draw on the earlier work of the London Borough of Merton and what is known as the Merton Rule: a 
planning provision which requires new urban developments to incorporate on-site renewable energy 
generation to meet 20% of its energy requirements. Organisations with varying degrees of autonomy 
12 
 
such as London First, the City of London Corporation, and the Climate Group have been closely 
involved in the development of a ‘low carbon transition’ narrative (Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012; 
see also Thornley et al., 2005). Particular parts of the city have had a catalytic role as well. In 
Brixton, the Brixton Transition Town movement (BTT) has been a crucial partner in the delivery of 
the city’s Low Carbon Zone established by the GLA. BTT operates locally as a community interest 
company raising awareness on climate change and peak oil issues, promoting a change in behaviours 
and engaging the community in a low-energy future.  
All of these actors draw on their own forms of autonomy for their work, highlighting the links 
between distributed and networked autonomy in the city. BTT, for example, experiments with 
innovative forms of community management, including participative design and democratic resource 
allocation. Although a territorially demarcated community-based organisation and social movement, 
BTT’s autonomy is not clearly demarcated by territory but rather is fluid and continually 
renegotiated, and it enjoys some autonomy from mainstream political culture, operating on the 
principles of ‘direct democracy’ rather than representative democracy. From an administrative 
perspective, it selects and runs its own projects, though these are often done in partnership with other 
community groups and local government. Financially, they have established a successful local 
currency, the Brixton Pound, which has fostered a new local economic space albeit one that is 
limited in extent and in comparison to wider financial flows in the area.  
The case of London illustrates how different degrees of partial autonomy can be combined to 
leverage significant levels of response to some of the key sustainability and social justice issues 
facing cities. The case also shows that autonomy does not arise purely from legal, institutional, or 
financial grounds. Rather, it points to the importance of a distributed form of autonomy, garnered at 
the intersections of multiple organisations. Instead of being conferred on institutions or 
organisations, autonomy is generated through the relation between them. Recognising autonomy in 
this way means that we need to also acknowledge that, as a political project, autonomy is usually not 
a means to achieve separation, but is rather an attempt to move towards plural self-determination or 
the possibility of engaging other actors on their own terms to work towards common goals.  
 
Mumbai: building networked autonomy from forced autonomy? 
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Many informal neighbourhoods in the global South are forced, as a result of long entrenched and 
growing urban inequalities, into a condition of forced autonomy, where a disconnection from some 
of the city’s networks occurs not by will or desire but rather in the context of exclusion. Yet, 
sometimes these autonomously organised practices can form templates for the emergence of more 
formal organisation of different sorts, from social activism and resistance to incorporation (not 
necessarily co-option) within government programmes. The incremental processes through which 
residents organise everyday life, for example, can provide a platform for social activism. This is the 
case of Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI), where the learning processes, knowledge and 
partnerships that emerge from informal practices give rise to forms of urban networked autonomy.  
Starting through organising ‘pavement dwellers’ on the streets of central Mumbai in the early 1980s, 
SDI has grown into a global movement operating in over 20 countries. The premise of the movement 
is to take the autonomous practices through which people organise everyday life—such as residents’ 
knowledge attained through incrementally building houses and infrastructures of sanitation and 
water—and use that knowledge to negotiate with municipal and state authorities. For example, a key 
strategy in SDI’s work is to build full-size model houses and public toilets and put these on display 
to government officials. By doing so, the aim—sometimes successful, often not—is to draw officials 
into discussions that lead to land and resources being provided to the poor so that they can build their 
own developments (McFarlane, 2011). In this process, the movement shifts the autonomous work of 
informal urban residents from incrementalism to a ‘radical incrementalism’ (Pieterse, 2008), where 
ordinary practices become a template for social change and people’s empowerment. 
Given SDI’s global reach, the movement has become an example of networked autonomy. The local 
members of SDI regularly meet to exchange information and ideas on organising. In such way, they 
produce an informal peer learning network that encourages other groups to use strategies like self-
built house modelling to negotiate with their local authorities. House modelling is one of a set of 
central ideas that circulate in the movement, producing a fine balance between the ideas that come 
from SDI leaders at national and international levels and the autonomy of the local SDI member 
groups interested in working out their own priorities. Nonetheless, this is a tension that does not 
always work successfully, and some groups—notably in South Africa—have felt their own priorities 
being marginalised by those of the global network. SDI’s story therefore provides two lessons for 
thinking about urban autonomy: first, the potential of using people’s existing practices to build more 
formal autonomous organisations; and, second, the difficult balance of linking autonomous groups 
through larger networks, and the risk that the larger network might erode that local autonomy 
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through commitment to particular agendas, ideas and directions, sometimes via endeavours to 
‘mainstream’ across wider territories. This is not to argue that autonomy should be imposed or forced 
upon groups or localities, but to illustrate how capacities can be built to convert forced autonomy 
into something more effective and meaningful. 
 
Delhi: fragmented autonomy out of neighbourhood autonomy? 
 
Our analysis of autonomy in Delhi explores a different element: the role of neighbourhood 
associations and the ‘new middle classes’ of the global South in the make-up of a fragmented 
autonomous city. The emphasis here is on the political risks associated with an increase in 
neighbourhood autonomy—and influence—in a city characterised by the emergence of marked class 
identities (Harriss, 2006). Since 2000 the Delhi government has implemented the Bhagidari 
program, which seeks to institutionalise citizen participation through a collaborative form of 
government aimed at involving the public in problem solving activities and the management of 
public assets. The main focus of the program is the city’s Resident Welfare Associations, or RWAs, 
essentially neighbourhood management committees in the city’s formally planned neighbourhoods, 
where members pay regular charges towards security and the maintenance of common resources 
(Chakrabarti, 2007). The program has resulted in improved urban services in those areas where it has 
been implemented, with RWAs actively involved in services such as waste management, 
neighbourhood security, and the maintenance of parks, street lighting and roads (Kundu, 2009). 
“Most of the activities of the Delhi government are now conducted under the rubric of Bhagidari” 
(Chakrabarti, 2007: 98). Through umbrella organizations, RWAs have become a powerful force in 
the city, as exemplified by their successful opposition to increases in electricity prices. However, the 
Bhagidari program has been criticized for having an exclusionary character and for creating urban 
fragmentation, as a result of its focus on elite and middle class neighbourhoods associated to formal 
land tenure (property) modes, and its exclusion of informal neighbourhoods where inhabitants have 
no tenure rights.  
The exclusionary and fragmented character of this form of autonomy rests on the ambiguity of 
government interventions in informal settlements: whilst government agencies continue to provide 
some basic services in slums, such as water, street lighting and pavement, they “avoid negotiations 
that may result in the provision of land titles” (Chakrabarti, 2007: 99). In such cities land reform is 
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likely to be a necessary condition for effective autonomy. The scope for low income urban dwellers 
to influence is further constrained as the RWAs, through the Bhagidari program, have a relatively 
direct access to city administrators. The RWAs have become an effective mode of local 
representation, albeit accessible only to specific sectors of society (Ghertner, 2011). The result has 
been a reduction in the influence of locally elected representatives and an increase in the power of 
middle and upper classes in determining the priorities of the city, moving away from a pro-poor 
agenda (Baud and Nainan, 2008). This represents the deepening of class identities as an active driver 
for urban politics: in a context of historic religious and caste identities—alongside their associated 
exclusions—and recent economic transformations that have failed to incorporate the needs of the 
poor, the middle classes are emerging as a strong political actor driving urban agendas through novel 
forms of autonomy (Fernandes and Heller, 2006).   
The case of Delhi highlights the extent to which neighbourhood autonomy is charged with 
conflicting local politics and identities, and the tensions and contradictions associated with increases 
in autonomy for certain groups at the expense of others. In this case, “programs designed to increase 
citizen–government partnership can have the surprising effect of making this space shallower and 
narrower, reducing the avenues of political participation open to the poor” (Ghertner, 2011: 526).  
 
Coalition localism in the UK: enclave autonomy? 
 
Shortly after entering power in 2010, the UK’s Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
asserted the significance of localism as ‘laying the foundations’ for its vision of a ‘Big Society’. 
Coalition localism was presented as a counterweight to decades of central government control, and 
Prime Minister David Cameron envisaged this process being enabled through a ‘catalyzing state’ 
designed to ‘unleash community engagement’. Amid a period of savage public spending cuts, 
Cameron envisaged this move would enable a crucial role for voluntary agencies, social 
entrepreneurs and community activists to combine effective public service reform with active 
citizenship (Cameron, 2010). In 2011, the government introduced the Localism Bill, arguably 
designed to transform central-local relations and ‘strengthen local democracy’ by devolving more 
power and freedom to councils and neighbourhoods while also revolutionizing the planning system 
in favour of local communities (Townsend, 2010). However, coalition localism can also be 
interpreted as an expression of top-down governmental hierarchy which, in the context of such 
austere cuts in public expenditure, forces the creation of enclaves where freedom to act is constrained 
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not by a lack of power but a lack of resources, with increasing levels of responsibility under financial 
constraint. The localism legislation heralds potentially far-reaching changes in the relationship 
between central government, local government, communities and individuals and a reconfiguration 
of the geographies of governmental autonomy, welfare and citizenship across Britain (Clarke and 
Cochrane, 2013).    
The Localism Act (HM Government, 2011) heralded several notable changes in policy and planning. 
Some of these are, first, “new freedoms and flexibility for local government”, including the ‘general 
power of competence’ to undertake any activities that do not contravene law (CLG, 2011: 1). 
Second, “new rights and powers for communities”, particularly the right for community associations 
to ‘challenge’ local authorities and ‘buy’ and assume control over and delivery of local services such 
as libraries and sports centres (CLG, 2011: 1). Third, a reform of the planning system—effectively a 
rescaling of planning responsibility—based on the abolition of Regional Development Agencies and 
the encouragement of Neighbourhood Plans designed to offer local communities ‘genuine 
opportunities’ to influence the future of their places, enabling a community’s right to build as well as 
deciding where new houses and commercial ventures are to be located (CLG, 2010). Finally, “reform 
to ensure that decisions about housing are taken locally”, whereby social landlords are ‘freed up’ to 
offer flexible (as opposed to ‘lifetime’) tenures and local authorities are given greater freedom to set 
their own policies on who qualifies for social housing (CLG, 2011: 1).  
This localism approach, amid a zealous fiscal austerity in local government and state finances, might 
be viewed to operate as a mode of coerced and strictly geographically limited autonomy. Such policy 
measures actively hamper the development of networked and distributed autonomy with mutual 
respect between different actors at different scales. Instead, such coerced autonomy can be used to 
support the replacement of a state-supported menu of community-oriented initiatives by one more 
markedly invoking (neo-) liberalizing ‘freedoms’ for individuals and communities to design and 
implement their own local ventures (Rose, 1999), with all the widening social inequalities such a 
transition risks. It marks a moment where “civil society actors begin increasingly to inherit public 
policy-making and service delivery functions in the past exercised largely by government” (Deas, 
2012: 1). While this could in principle offer some scope for local democracy, it may also become a 
smokescreen for government to off-load responsibilities onto communities (Purcell, 2006), without 
the financial or other capacities needed to deliver them fairly. Such coerced autonomy could 
compromise nation-wide scope for service delivery and social citizenship, and perhaps even see 
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services and major elements of the built environment privatized in favour of powerful economic and 
corporate interests (Featherstone et al., 2012; Painter et al., 2011). 
These brief examples from the UK and India show that autonomy cannot be forced, nor thoughtlessly 
devolved onto already unequal communities without risking the exclusion of new groups from city 
spaces and city economies. They illustrate risks and potentials in the relationship between city 
authorities and already existing forms of local and networked autonomy taking place within and 
between cities. Alongside the other examples examined, they illustrate how autonomy, beyond a 
political ideal, is a practice that emerges from within specific sectors of particular societies and 
through their relationship with national and regional politics.  
 
Conclusion: renewing autonomy? 
Whilst ideas of autonomy travel easily from site to site and country to country, the specific 
environment where such autonomy is to be realised plays a key role in determining what it can really 
achieve. Autonomy, usually considered in terms of its financial, political or administrative 
dimensions, has a multiplicity of issues at stake. As illustrated by the examples used in this paper, 
geographical and historical context are critical, and notions of autonomy that have been successful in 
certain countries at the time of particular political regimes can fail when implemented elsewhere. 
National and regional politics do not just sit in the background; they are the actual arenas and sites of 
everyday practice around and through which possibilities for local autonomy open or close. The 
nation state, as a site of struggle where different interests compete, has historically played a primary 
role in promoting or limiting autonomy (Jessop, 2016). Where urban autonomy emerges, this is often 
the result of a potent combination of political will and public demand. In turn, autonomy creates new 
kinds of politics.  
We identified four alternative forms of urban autonomy, arguing that the spatial templates for 
autonomy are not predetermined, but can be enhanced in multiple different sites and forms of 
political space within the city. The first is distributed autonomy, where autonomy is purposefully 
designed as a form of political power sharing. This can enable alternative forms of political 
expressions and action, and is sometimes managed hierarchically. Second, networked autonomy, 
which is based on the functioning of autonomous units within the city, such as social movements, 
working in tandem and linking ideas together. The third is fragmented autonomy, based on the 
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presence of autonomous units and processes, but operating in chaotic and fragmented ways, and 
where objectives and processes are not joined up. Finally coerced or ‘enclave’ autonomy, a top-down 
governmental autonomy with strong elements of hierarchical management. We argue that distributed 
and networked autonomy cannot function without enhanced participation for all, and that urban 
autonomy itself is a generative and relational process made through the autonomy of different 
institutions in and beyond the city, within the context of unequal and often changing power and 
social relations. Enhanced autonomy, transcending forms of ‘fragmented’ and ‘coerced autonomy’—
especially in the economic realm—appears essential for the integration and strengthening of 
capacities for sustainable and just development of and in our cities. 
Forms of forced autonomy are common in many cities, as illustrated by the examples of Mumbai, 
Delhi and localism in the UK; and although these can provide the basis for new forms of social 
organisation and networked autonomy that might provide empowerment across different urban 
contexts, they also risk creating new forms of social exclusion, and can also be seen as a result of 
asymmetries of power and influence, or more meaningfully, where those charged with shaping the 
institutional ensemble of the state engage in distributing resources selectively, unfairly and often in 
the face of democracy. Challenging these—and the interests such inequalities serve—is a critical task 
for a new political project of enhanced autonomy. This is all the more important as autonomy can be 
a means through which existing inequalities are maintained (via fragmented autonomy) or where 
new forms of hierarchical control are imposed on communities who have little capacity to respond to 
the challenges they face (via coerced autonomy); this reminds us that autonomy is not necessarily 
progressive, and that it matters a great deal who gets to participate in the political project and who is 
excluded.  
Using comparison as a learning strategy, the examples in this paper suggest that effective distributed 
autonomy cannot be achieved through coercion, but this does not preclude efforts to enable and 
incentivise it through careful policy design. Nor can genuine autonomy even be simply ‘granted’—it 
must be asserted and negotiated by those who would wield it with responsibility. Distributed 
autonomy can provide a means through which to generate new spaces for politics in which 
environmental and social justice goals can be pursued; but raise challenges of co-ordination, co-
option and the remaining presence of hierarchy—in London, Delhi and Mumbai for example, new 
forms of autonomy are being generated at the intersections of the partial distributed autonomy and 
social networks present in the city, which could provide a means through which to leverage new 
spaces for politics in the city. A vital challenge here is responding to the fact the city is already 
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fragmented. Consider, for instance, the powerful inequalities in housing in all three cities with the 
competing agendas of social justice and vested real estate. Any attempt to incentivise autonomy in 
such a context will always be up against the challenges established by the conflicting positions of the 
city’s different actors, and the socio-economic positions that they inherit and are forced to confront. 
The associated development and redevelopment of urban space, with ever more enclosure and 
privatisation of previously public or common spaces, as documented by Harvey (2012), responds 
directly to the interests of financial capital, thinly shrouded in the notion of ‘competitiveness in the 
modern knowledge economy’. Such economic relational autonomy is a powerful influence—perhaps 
the dominant one in many cities—but it is not what we consider meaningful or responsible 
autonomy. 
Yet, the challenges facing declining industrial conurbations and growing cities in developing 
countries are very different. How can distributed autonomy provide—if not ‘autonomy from’ then 
‘insulation against’—the negative impacts of global competition or of limited institutional 
capacities? In practice, the pursuit of autonomy—however conceived—will remain shaped by 
financial and institutional capacity, contestation of the scope, function and boundaries of autonomy, 
and the nature of public participation. To strengthen and knit together forms of enhanced autonomy 
will take a mix of actions, in some respects inevitably specific. In each state, and potentially each 
city, different (state and non-state) bodies will need different new powers and particularly new 
capacities. To focus on enhanced fiscal, political and administrative powers for city authorities 
misses the importance of other capacities and other actors. The examples from London, Durban, 
Porto Alegre and Mumbai suggest that NGOs, community organisations, social processes and city 
authorities all need enhanced capacities to collaborate in creating new political spaces, as well as 
greater financial autonomy from the centre. Inevitably autonomy, as a political project, must involve 
significant challenges of addressing social and environmental justice, both internally and in relation 
to wider global concerns.  
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